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Metaphor as Structure-Mapping: What Develops
This research investigated the development of metaphor.
Specifically, we studied the development of an implicit
interpretation strategy found in adults of mapping relational
structure from base to target. Children aged 5-6 and 9-10 and
adults interpreted metaphors of three types: Attribute,
Relation, and Double. In Attribute metaphors the predicates
shared by the base and target objects were object-attributes:
e.g., "Both are round." In Relation metaphors the shared
predicates were relations: e.g., "Both help people get well."
In Double metaphors, both attributes and relations were shared.
The attributionality and relationality of the
interpretations were scored by independent judges. The major
result is that the relationality of the responses increases
significantly with age. Attributionality shows no age increase.
These results indicate a developmental increase in relational
focusing. Other aspects of the data indicate that this trend may
be due in part to the accretion of knowledge.
Experimental studies show a marked developmental change in
children's fluency at interpreting metaphors. A four-year-old
asked, "Can a person be sweet?" answers literally: e.g., "Not
unless he was made out of chocolate" (Asch & Nerlove, 1960).
Similarly, young children are poor at matching sentences with
metaphorically related pictures (Kogan, 1975); and at choosing
appropriate metaphorical completions for sentences (Gardner,
Kircher, Winner, & Perkins, 1975). These and many other
experimental results seemed to indicate that metaphorical ability
develops gradually and late. Until a decade ago, this was the
dominant position (e.g., Inhelder & Piaget, 1958).
However, observations of spontaneous speech lead to a
different conclusion (Chukovsky, 1968; Winner, 1979). For
example, a fifteen-month old girl used "moon" to refer not only
to the moon but to a half-grapefruit and a hangnail (Bowerman,
1976). Tad, a two-year-old boy, observed that a crescent moon
was "bent, like a banana." On another occasion he jumped into a
pile of pillows and announced "leafs." It is unlikely that all
such extensions can be accounted for as errors in meaning or
usage (see Bloom, 1973; Thomson & Chapman, 1975; Winner, 1979).
Such discrepancies suggest that a reanalysis of the phenomenon is
required.
Abstract
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We must separate the course of genuine metaphoric
development from various other contributors to task performance.
To do this, we need a theory of metaphoric competence. In this
paper we use the structure-mapping theory of analogy (Gentner,
1980, 1982, 1983; Gentner & Gentner, 1983) as a framework for
developmental questions. This theory describes a set of rules by
which the interpretation of an analogy is derived from the
meanings of its terms. The central principle is that, for
adults, metaphors and analogies are mappings from one semantic
domain (the base domain) to another (the target domain), which
convey that certain semantic relationships in the base domain
exist in the target. Elements in the base are placed in
correspondence with elements in the target. Predicates are mapped
from base to target according to the following mapping rules:
(a) Relations between objects (such as ATTACH[x,y]) tend to be
mapped across; (b) Attributes of objects (such as RED[x]) tend to
be dropped; (c) The particular relations mapped are determined by
systematicity, as defined by the existence of higher-order
constraining relations which can themselves be mapped.
As an example, consider A. E. Housman's metaphor, "I can no
more define poetry than a terrier can define a rat." Clearly
Housman does not mean to convey that poetry is like a rat. We
are not meant to map the object-attributes of rats onto poetry,
nor those of terriers onto the poet. Instead, the intended
interpretation maps a system of relations: e.g., PURSUE
(terrier, rat), ALTHOUGH/UNABLE [DEFINE (terrier, rat)] / carries
across into PURSUE (poet, poetry), ALTHOUGH/UNABLE [DEFINE poet,
poetry)]/. For adults, the system of shared relations
constitutes the ground--the set of implicit commonalities between
base and target--and plays an important role in memory for
metaphors and analogies (Verbrugge, 1975; Verbrugge & McCarrell,
1973).
Once metaphoric processing is viewed as a mapping, it
becomes clear that factors other than metaphorical ability have
contributed to the developmental trends in some of the
experimental tasks (Gentner, 1977a,b). One common confounding is
use of conventional metaphors (e.g., "hard-hearted" or "trigger-
tempered") for which standard interpretations can be learned.
Another is differences in domain knowledge. Children's ability
to demonstrate metaphorical ability is limited by their knowledge
of the domains involved. For example, without knowledge of our
cultural models of personality and emotion, children could not
produce appropriate interpretations of such metaphors as a
"hard/soft person" or "sweet/bitter feelings," regardless of
their metaphorical ability. A third factor limiting children's
performance is their understanding of the task pragmatics. Young
children given a question like, "Can a person be sweet?" may be
more likely than older children to assume that their literal
knowledge of word meaning is being called into question; and to
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respond literally even if they are capable of metaphorical
responding.
If these confounds are removed, can young children
demonstrate metaphoric ability? Two earlier studies demonstrate
that preschool children possess basic metaphoric competence:
i.e., that they can map systems of relations consistently from
base domain to target domain urder the right circumstances
(Gentner, 1977a,b). Subjects were asked to map from the base
domain, a human body, to the target domain, a pictured concrete
object. For example, a child was shown a picture of a tree and
asked, "If the tree had a knee (or shoulder, etc.), where would
it be?" Children as young as four-to-five were able to perform
the mapping as well as adults. Even under difficult conditions--
when the pictures were turned upside down, or when misleading
local details were added to the pictures--children preserved the
set of transitive vertical relations that hold among body parts.
These tasks satisfy four criteria for a fair assessment.
First, no conventional metaphors were used. Second, even the
youngest children were familiar with the conceptual domains.
Moreover, since the target domains were presented pictorially,
the children had no difficulty accessing the required spatial
relations. Relations in the base domain, the human body, were
also available for inspection; and indeed, some of the younger
children occasionally glanced at their own bodies in deciding on
their answers. Third, the phrasing of the question as "If a tree
had a knee, where would it be?" makes it clear that the child is
to use an analogical interpretation. To underscore this last
point, compare children's responses to two trial queries: when
asked "Can a chair have an elbow?" and "Can a hill have hair?,"
every single preschooler answered "No" to both. Finally, it is
important that there was an objective, theoretically based
criterion for level of performance.
In recent times there have been a fair number of other
studies designed to allow young children to demonstrate as much
of their competence as possible. These studies have avoided many
of the old confoundings; they provide naturalistic contexts for
metaphor interpretation and utilize responses such as pointing or
acting out, rather than verbal explanation (e.g., Dent &
Ledbetter, 1983; Vosniadou & Ortony, 1983; Winner, 1983). Each
of these "fair test" studies has succeeded in demonstrating some
early metaphoric ability. Yet there remain strong age
differences.
The results of the last decade of research leave no doubt
that preschool children possess basic metaphoric ability. It is
equally clear that there is still a developmental progression to
be accounted for. We are now ready for a more precise set of
questions. Given that the bulk of the findings show a
developmental progression, is this due to the learning of better
mapping strategies for analogy, or to the accretion of domain-
specific knowledge, or to some deeper cognitive change (see
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Carey, in press; Conner, 1983). In order to examine more closely
the reasons that young children perform well or badly in
metaphoric tasks, we asked children to interpret metaphors of
different types across several different domains. We then
analyzed the propositional structure of their responses.
In prior experiments, adults have been found to obey the
structure-mapping rules described above. When asked to interpret
metaphorical comparisons, adults focus on relational information,
rather than object-attribute information; and they consider those
metaphors more apt for which relational mappings can be found
(Gentner, 1980). Therefore, in the present study we address the
following developmental questions: (a) do young children show
this relational focus; and (b) if they fail to demonstrate
relational mappings in some situations, exactly why are they
failing.
We collected interpretations of metaphors from children and
adults, as well as aptness ratings of the metaphors. These
interpretations were then scored by independent judges for
relationality and attributionality. There were three metaphor
types: attributional metaphors [e.g., "Pancakes are nickels."
(Both are round)]; relational metaphors [e.g., "A tire is a
shoe." (Both are used by moving figures as points of contact with
the ground.)]; and double metaphors with both attributes and
relations in common [e.g., "Plant stems are like drinking
straws." (Both are long and cylindrical; both are used to bring
liquids from below to nourish a living thing.)]. According to
the theory, an ideal responder should show three characteristics.
First, for relational and double metaphors, the metaphor
interpretations should include many relational propositions and
not many object-attributes. (For the attribute metaphors, there
is no choice but to focus on attributes, since no relations are
shared by the base and target.) Second, the aptness ratings
should be positively correlated with the relationality of the
metaphor interpretations. Finally, as a corollary to the first
two predictions, the aptness ratings should be lower for
attribute metaphors than for relational and double metaphors.
The method was designed to minimize the influence of other
developmental changes besides metaphorical development. First,
to circumvent differences in pragmatic knowledge, a series of
amplifications was designed to make the point of the question
clear to the children. Second, in order to minimize differences
in domain knowledge, we used highly familiar domains. Finally,
to rule out prior exposure as a developmental confounding, the
comparisons were novel; no idioms or conventional metaphors were
used.
Method
Subjects. There were ten subjects from each of three age
groups: five- to six-year olds (5 boys and 5 girls), nine- to
ten-year olds (4 boys and 6 girls) and college students from
psychology classes at the University of California at San Diego
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(7 males and 3 females). The children were recruited from
schools in Del Mar and La Jolla, California and were of
approximately the same middle-class SES as the college subjects.
Stimuli. There were eight instances of each of three types of
metaphor: (a) attribute metaphors, in which base and target
shared many attributes but few relations; (b) relation metaphors,
in which base and target shared many relations but few
attributes; and (c) double metaphors in which base and target
shared both relations and attributes. Examples of the three
kinds of metaphors are:
Attribute: The sun is like an orange. (Both are round and
orange.)
Relation: A camera is like a tape recorder. (Both record
events to re-experience at a later time.)
Double: A hummingbird is like a helicopter. (Both have
stubby shapes and blurry parts; both use rapid
motion to achieve maneuverability in air.)
There were twenty-four comparisons in all, as shown in Table 1.
All subjects interpreted all the metaphors.
--------------  
Insert Table 1 about here.
----------------------
Procedure. The task was administered to the adults in
written form, in groups. To be sure that the children understood
all the terms, all subjects were first asked to describe the
separate objects that later appeared in the metaphors. Indeed,
all subjects succeeded in producing enough correct descriptive
information to demonstrate basic familiarity with each object.
The objects were presented in random order, unpaired. They were
not told about the metaphor task at this time.
After completing the object descriptions, subjects were
shown the metaphors. Adults were asked to write out their
interpretations of the metaphors. They were also asked to rate
the aptness of the metaphors--i.e., how clever, interesting or
worthwhile they were--on 1-5 scales. In addition, adults rated
the metaphoricity of each comparison--i.e., the degree to which
the comparison was one of literal similarity versus a
metaphorical (nonliteral) comparison. Metaphoricity ratings were
not elicited from children and are not considered further here.
The task was administered to children orally and
individually. The children's responses were tape recorded. They
were first asked to describe the 48 objects involved. Then they
were asked to interpret the metaphors. A graded series of
questions was used to be sure that the children understood the
task.' The experimenter would ask, "Is a hummingbird a
helicopter?". If the child responded literally ("No, a
hummingbird is a bird."), the experimenter asked, "What does it
mean if I say 'A hummingbird is a helicopter.'?". If the child
still responded literally, the experimenter asked, "What does it
mean if I say 'A hummingbird is like a helicopter.'?". If the
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child gave any comparison interpretation after any of the
questions, the experimenter went onto the next comparison. Most
children after a few such sequences caught on that a nonliteral
response was in order and thereafter produced one after each new
query. After interpreting the metaphor, children rated its
aptness by pointing to one of five schematic faces, ranging from
very sad (low aptness) to very happy (high aptness).
Scoring. Groups of from two to four trained judges rated
the responses on two five-point scales, a relational scale and an
attributional scale. These judges had first received six hours
of training in the use of propositional notation. They rated
each metaphor interpretation as to its relationality--i.e.,
whether its predicates expressed relations between objects in the
domain--and its attributionality--whether its predicates
described objects in and of themselves. An interpretation
received a 5 rating on relationality (attributionality) if it
included any clearly relational (attributional) statement. This
method was sensitive to the presence or absence of relational (or
attributional) information in a given interpretation, and
relatively insensitive to the number of different relations (or
attributes) mentioned in an interpretation. We chose this
scoring method to minimize the effect of differences in length of
responses.
The basic scoring decision was whether a proposition
expressed a one-place predicate (an attribute) or a 2-or-more
place predicate (a relation) over the domain. Most adjectives
are attributes; e.g., "Both are yellow" is an attribute. It can
be written as a one-place predicate, YELLOW(X). A transitive
verb, such as "Both help people" is a relation. It can be
written as a two-place predicate, HELP(X, people). Other
relational terms include comparative adjectives (e.g., "longer
than") and prepositions (e.g., "behind"). A decision had to be
made about certain relations which can also be expressed as
surface attributes (see Miller, 1979). For example, the
proposition "X puts people to sleep" is clearly a relation.
However, the adjectival proposition "X is soporific" is a one-
place predicate on the surface (soporific[x]), but actually
conveys the relational information that there exist being(s) whom
X puts to sleep. Such relational adjectives were scored as 3 on
the relational scale and 3 on the attributional scale.
The metaphor interpretations were read in random order, so
that none of the judges knew the ages of the subjects. They were
not told the aptness rating or metaphoricity rating of the
original metaphors. Only one of the judges knew the design of
the experiment. Inter-rater agreement ranged from 85% to 100% on
different metaphors. Table 2 shows sample responses scored as
relational or attributional.
Insert Table 2 about here.
------- -------~~ ~ ~
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Results
The major result is a strong upward developmental trend in
the use of relations in the interpretations. Figure la shows the
rated relationality of the interpretations for the three types of
metaphor across age. Relationality increases steadily with age
for the metaphors that permit relational interpretation--i.e.,
the relational and double metaphors. Attribute metaphors, of
course, show no such increase, since they were designed to have
only attributes in common between the base and target.
In contrast, there is no developmental increase in
propensity to use attributional information. As Figure Ib shows,
within each class of metaphor, the attributionality ratings were
constant across age.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
------------- -----------
Two separate two-way, 3 (Age) X 3 (Metaphor Type) analyses
of variance were performed: one for the relationality ratings
and one for the attributionality ratings. In the relationality
analysis, both the main effect of Age and the Age X Metaphor-type
interaction were significant, F(2,27) = 12.76, y < .01; F(4,54) =
5.48, j < .01. This Age effect confirms a strong developmental
trend in the use of relations in metaphorical interpretation.
The Age X Metaphor-type interaction reflects the fact that, as
expected, the age increase in relationality occurs only for the
relational and double metaphors.
On the attributionality analysis, there was no significant
main effect of Age; nor was the Age X Metaphor-type interaction
significant. There is no developmental trend in propensity to
produce attributional interpretations of metaphors.
In both the relational and attributional analyses, the main
effect of Metaphor type was strongly significant; F(2,54) =
191.63, y < .001; F(2,54) = 265.06, 2 < .001, respectively. For
all ages, the relational comparisons received the highest
relational ratings and the attributional comparisons received the
highest attributional ratings. The double comparisons are
intermediate on both rating scales. Thus, the results agree well
with a priori categorization of stimuli. This orderly pattern is
a good sign.
The performance on double metaphors is of special interest.
By design, the double metaphors could support either an
attributional or a relational interpretation. To see which kind
of propositions subjects focused on in double metaphors, planned
comparisons were performed between the relationality ratings and
the attributionality ratings of the double metaphors, within each
age group. For the two older age-groups, the mean relationality
for the double metaphors is significantly greater than the mean
attributionality. [For age 9-10, t(9) = 2.78, 2 < .05; and for
adults, t(9) = 3.79, y < .05.] However, for the 5-6 year-olds,
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there is no significant difference between relationality and
attributionality for double metaphors [t(9) = 1.93, NS]. This
pattern again suggests a developmental shift towards
relationality.
Aptness ratings. As predicted by the structure-mapping
theory, the aptness ratings for adult subjects were positively
correlated with relationality, r(20) = .55, 2 < .01; but not with
attributionality. Indeed, the adult aptness ratings were
negatively correlated with attributionality, r(20) = -.42, R <
.05. These patterns replicate the positive correlation of
aptness with relationality, but not with attributionality, found
in prior research with adults (Gentner, 1980).
Children do not show these patterns. There were no
significant correlations between aptness and either relationality
or attributionality for either of the age groups of children.
Another indication that relationality figures heavily in
adult aptness judgments is that adults' mean aptness ratings for
double and relational metaphors are considerably higher than for
attribute metaphors, t(7) = 2.8, 2 < .05. As Figure 2 shows,
children do not show this pattern: their mean aptness ratings do
not differ significantly across the three types of metaphors. We
must be cautious here, since the children may simply have lacked
facility with the aptness scale. Still, these data suggest a
developmental difference in implicit criteria for juding aptness
in metaphor.
Insert Figure 2 about here.
Propositional count. In order to consider whether greater
knowledge affected the adults' responses, we made a further count
of number of different propositions used by each subject on each
metaphor. For all three classes of metaphors, adults mention
significantly more proposition types than either group of
children, as shown in Figure 3. The two groups of children
differ only on attribute metaphors, for which the older children
produce more proposition types than the younger group. This
finding of an age increase in the number of types of propositions
mentioned suggests that the developmental difference in metaphor
interpretation stems partly from increases in domain knowledge.
Insert Figure 3 about here.
Discussion
As predicted by the structure-mapping theory, the adults in
this study focused on mapping across relational systems. There
are several indications of this pattern. First, adult responses
were rated high in relationality overall. Second, in particular
when given metaphors that could support either a relational or an
attributional interpretation (the double metaphors), adults
interpreted them more relationally than attributionally. Third,
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adults rated the relational and double metaphors as more apt than
the attribute metaphors. Fourth, aptness for adults correlates
positively with judged relationality, but negatively with judged
attributionality. Adults appear both to seek relational
predicates in metaphorical mapping and to judge the aptness of
the comparison according to the relationality of the mapping.
The children did not show this strong relational focus. The
tendency to produce relational interpretations increased markedly
with age over the period from five years to adulthood. The
treatment of double metaphors also showed a developmental trend.
For nine-year-olds, double metaphors were interpreted more
relationally than attributionally, just as for adults. But for
five-year-olds, there was no significant difference between the
relationality and attributionality of the double metaphors, and
indeed the mean attributionality was slightly higher. Finally,
for both groups of children, the aptness ratings showed no
preference for relationally interpreted metaphors.
Overall, these results show a clear developmental increase
in relational focus. Now we must ask what underlies this
developmental change. The structure-mapping framework suggests
four possible reasons that children might fail to map relational
structure: (a) they might lack the basic competence to abstract
shared relations; (b) they might be able to perform simple
relational mappings, but lack the ability to map complex sets of
relations; (c) they might lack the implicit rule that metaphor
and analogy involve mappings of relational systems, and therefore
include other kinds of likenesses; (d) they might possess both
the correct understanding of metaphoric mapping and the ability
to map complex relational systems, but still fail due to lack of
knowledge of the relevant domain relations. Reasons (a) or (b)
would mean that it is the basic cognitive capacity for metaphoric
processing that develops--i.e., some aspect of the ability to
carry out the relational mapping. In contrast, reasons (c) and
(d), in different ways, implicate the acquisition of knowledge
rather than the growth of cognitive ability (see Brown &
Campione, in press, and Carey, in press, for discussions of this
issue). Reason (c) would mean that what changes is pragmatic
knowledge of the implicit rules for analogy and metaphor, and of
the difference between analogy/metaphor and literal similarity.
Reason (d) would mean that what changes is the amount and depth
of domain knowledge.
The research presented here does not settle the question
completely, but, in combination with other work, it will allow us
to narrow the set of hypotheses. First, we can rule out the most
extreme possibility, (a), that preschoolers lack the basic
ability to map relations. One piece of counter-evidence, as
discussed above, is that preschool children can abstract and map
simple systems of spatial relations (Gentner, 1977a,b). A
further demonstration is Crisafi and Brown's (1983) finding that
in learning-transfer studies, three-year-old children can map
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relational structures corresponding to problem representations
across dissimilar physical situations. Finally, there is the
evidence of preschoolers' spontaneous metaphors. Although, as
Winner (1979) notes, many early metaphors are based primarily on
perceptual-attribute overlap--as in the examples quoted earlier
of comparing the moon to a hang nail or a banana--still, slightly
older children produce metaphors that are clearly relational.
The child I observed, Tad, at 3;2 had a favorite blanket he
normally carried. On receiving a new blanket, he showed it to me
saying "It's full of gas." He then pointed to the bedraggled old
blanket and said "This one not . . . is . . .is out of gas."
Such usages are evidence that young children are able to map
relations.
Having ruled out explanation (a), lack of basic cognitive
ability to map relations, we now have the remaining possibilities
to consider: (b) inability to carry out complex mappings, (c)
lack of pragmatic knowledge about the implicit rules for analogy,
and (d) lack of domain knowledge. This study produced no direct
evidence for or against possibility (b): that there is a
developmental increase in the complexity of mappings that can be
handled. However, Sternberg and Downing (1982) have evidence
that adolescents go through some of the same stages of
interpretation when dealing with complex analogies between
analogies that younger children do with simple analogies.
Whether this results from a change in cognitive processing
capacity or merely from learning mapping skills is unclear
(Gentner & Brown, in preparation). In any case, it is possible
that becoming able to manage more complex mappings is a factor in
the development of metaphor.
We have some evidence for possibility (c), a change in
knowledge of the pragmatics or aesthetics of the mapping
conventions. Children's aptness ratings did not depend on the
relationality of their interpretations in the way that adults'
did. For adults, the criterion for aptness in metaphor appears
to be maximal carryover of relations with minimal carryover of
attributes; in contrast, we theorize that the aptness criterion
for literal similarity is simply maximal carryover of predicates
of all types (Gentner, 1983; Tversky, 1977). Children do not
appear to share adult aesthetic standards for metaphor. It is
possible that they simply fail to distinguish analogy/metaphor
from literal similarity. This evidence must be regarded as
tentative, since children may not have understood the aptness
scale; still, changes in pragmatic knowledge remain a possible
factor in development of metaphor.
Finally, we have evidence for possibility (d), that
metaphoric development is partly reducible to an increase in
domain knowledge. The age increase in number of proposition
types suggests that the older subjects were bringing more
different knowledge to bear on their interpretations. We suggest
that adults performed more relationally than children in part
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because they knew more about the domains. Knowing the knowledge
structures in the individual domains gave adults more options for
creating relational mappings.
The analysis of relational versus attributional information
allows a more detailed view of how metaphoric strategies develop.
The results presented here show, first, that a major trend in the
development of metaphor is an increase in relational focus.
Second, these results suggest that acquisition of knowledge plays
a large role in the developmental increase in relationality.
Carey (in press) has argued that developmental progressions can
often be accounted for in terms of the acquisition of different
kinds of knowledge. Here, we suggest that acquisition of both
local domain knowledge and knowledge of the rules of mapping
contribute to the developmental sequence. Third, our results
support the structure-mapping approach, replicating and extending
prior studies of relationality in metaphor interpretation.
The developmental picture that emerges is that the ability
to map similar relational systems between different domains is
present early in language development. However, more is required
before this skill can be used appropriately by adult standards.
Children must learn the conversational rules governing when
figurative speech is appropriate and how it is signalled. They
must learn the rules for aesthetic use of mappings. They must
learn conceptual systems more abstract than the physical
relations considered in this study before they can accurately
analogize about them. Finally, to deal with complex metaphors, a
child may need to learn to map simultaneously many different
relationships.
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Footnote
This amplification technique was essentially one of
restating metaphors as similes if a child did not understand.
This was based on Reynolds and Ortony's (1980) finding that young
children perform better with similes ("X is like a Y.") than with
metaphors ("X is a Y.").
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Table 2
Sample Interpretations of Different Classes of Metaphors
ATTRIBUTIONAL METAPHOR
AGE:
The sun is an orange.
5-6 "They're both orange."
(1,5)
"They're round and
orange." (1,5)
9-10 "They both are orange."
(1,5)
"It's like a circle and
so is the sun." (1,5)
Adult "Both are orange; both
spherical." (1,5)
"The sun looks like an
orange." (1,3)
RELATIONAL METAPHOR
A tire is a shoe.
"You can walk in shoes the
same way you can go somewhere
on tires." (5,1)
"Sometimes your shoe is black and
the tire is black." (1,5)
"A tire is on the bottom of a car
and that's sort of like where your
shoe would go if that was the
body." (5,1)
"You can go places on both." (5,1)
"Both are coverings that come in
direct contact with the terrain."
(5,1)
"Both are used for transportation
of people or things; for
protection also." (5,1)
DOUBIE METAPHOR
Plant stems are drinking straws.
"They're both straight." (1,5)
"They're both round." (1,5)
"Plant stems are thin and so are
straws." (1,5)
"If you put water down in the ground,
the plant stems will soak up water
just like the straws." (5,1)
"They are both used for drawing in
water. They are both tubular." (5,5)
"Both are straight and have liquid
running through." (5,5)
Note: The figures in parentheses give the rated relationality and attributionality of the response.
ct(D
it
(D
a
~---------------- ~ -~~~---~~---- --- - ------ :- ------------- --------------
-- - -- ----- - --------- - - - - - - - - - - - -- -- - - - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- --
Figure Captions
Figure la. Mean ratings of relationality for interpretations of
different types of metaphor across age.
Figure lb. Mean ratings of attributionality for interpretations of
different types of metaphors across age.
Figure 2. Mean aptness ratings for different types of metaphors across
age.
Figure 3. Mean number of proposition types for different metaphor
classes across age.
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